The Role of Religion in Shaping Sociocultural Self-Identification of Society in Kazakhstan

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Abstract

Religiosity acts as an important marker of personal self-identification and an identification marker of social processes. The paradigm in relation to religion is changing: the secularism of the state and ideological pluralism contributes to an expanded understanding of religion not only as a spiritual tradition, but also as an institution of socialization. This article examines the dynamics of religiosity in Kazakhstan, focusing on the impact of traditional and new forms of religiosity on sociocultural self-identification. The research utilizes a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. The study reveals the evolving nature of religiosity in Kazakhstan within a context of ideological pluralism, emphasizing the complex interplay between traditional and new forms of religiosity and highlighting the need for strategies to maintain social cohesion and effective ideological socialization in this multicultural, multi-confessional society. The study contributes to understanding the religiolization process in Kazakhstan and its implications for individual and collective identities in a multicultural and multi-confessional society.

Keywords: Islamization, conversion, ideological identity, post-secularity, religiosity, religiolization, secularism, values

1. Introduction

Religion plays a significant role in shaping societies and individuals, and the Kazakh community has developed multi-level discourses about religion that span international, regional, and state-national contexts (Muratzhan et al., 2021; Abdimaulen et al., 2022). The study of religiosity in Kazakhstan is
important for understanding the dynamics of religiolization in a post-secular era (Taylor, 2007). The institutionalization of religious studies, with its roots in the Western scientific tradition, has a long history, drawing on concepts that highlight the importance of religion in societal survival, the construction of social order, and the sacralization of social ties (Zhaparova et al., 2023).

The transformation of religious traditions, the diversification of religious meanings, and the complexity of sociality have led to the revision of epistemological attitudes and the emergence of conceptual schemes that consider religion within the broader context of social dynamics (Butorov et al., 2022). Berger (1969) pointed to the pendulum of secularization/desecularization. Stark (1999) linked secularization with modernization, in which religiolization manifests itself in the conditions of pluralization, rationalization, technologization, informatization, urbanization, which are the mainstream of post-secular society. Asad (2003) conceptualizes the genealogical perspective of the formation of "religion" and its modern binary "other" – "secular", developing the concept of religious-secular binary. Wohlrab-Sahr and Burkhardt (2012) formulated the concept of multiple secularities, defining it as forms of distinction between religious and other societal (non-religious) spheres that have their own institutional embodiments and reference problems.

These conceptual schemes encompass secularization, desecularization, counter-secularization, and multiple secularities, each offering unique insights into the religious process and religiosity in contemporary society.

Modernity, characterized by processes such as pluralization, rationalization, technologization, and urbanization, has acted as a catalyst for secularization while simultaneously fostering religious pluralism. The phenomenon of the "market of spiritualistic goods" has emerged as a response to the diverse religious ideas and associations present in today's globalized world (Pelkmans, 2009). As Kazakhstan and Central Asia undergo religious conversions and experience changes in the religious landscape, the study of the modern religious process in this region becomes particularly relevant (Kaliyev et al., 2023).

The growing influence of traditional and new institutions, coupled with the increasing prevalence of ideological pluralism, further underscores the importance of research on religiosity. In this context, the term "Religionization" serves as a heuristic concept that designates specific spaces, practices, narratives, and languages as religious, enabling a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of religion in contemporary society, particularly within procedural states (Dreßler, 2019; Kemerbay et al., 2020).

This article aims to contribute to the study of religiolization in Kazakhstan, exploring the dynamics of religiosity, the impact of religious institutions, and the role of religion in shaping individual and collective identities (Togaibayeva et al., 2020). Kazakhstan positions itself as a secular state, in which the multi-confessional and multicultural society is reproduced. Being located on the border of different civilizational worlds, Kazakhstan is both potentially and actually involved in the process of globalization, which, in turn, actualizes identification processes, including religious aspirations.

In multi-confessional and multicultural Kazakhstan, which is located on the border of different civilizational worlds and is potentially and actually involved in the process of globalization, it is important not only to find, but also to confirm and maintain a unique identity. During the years of sovereignization, the process of self-identification unfolded in understanding the place and role of religious traditions in general and the Islamic tradition in particular.

Islamization has manifested itself as the main trend of the religionization of society, which expands the area of Islamic identity and corresponding values, life aspirations. Many questions related to the activation, spread, and rooting of Islamic values in the Kazakh area have yet to be answered. In our study, we focused on analyzing the general contours associated with the perception and assessment of the scale and significance of Islamic values in two projections: for Muslim believers and for the population as a whole, without reference to religious affiliation. For the tasks of sociological measurement, Islamic values were verified and offered to respondents to assess them as significant and priority.
By examining the interplay between religion, society, and state, this research seeks to provide valuable insights for promoting social cohesion, fostering proper ideological socialization, and navigating the challenges and opportunities posed by the diverse religious landscape in Kazakhstan.

Therefore, the purpose of the study was to determine the impact of traditional and new forms of religiosity on the sociocultural self-identification of society in the context of Kazakhstan.

2. Methods

The study aims to examine the cultural and ideological mindset of the population of Kazakhstan, with a specific focus on religion and values. The research utilizes a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. The methodology employed in this study ensures a rigorous and comprehensive examination of the ideological mentality of Kazakhstan with a specific focus on religion and values. By combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, expert assessments, and focus group studies, the research provides a holistic understanding of the religious landscape and its influence on the population’s mindset. The study utilizes comparative discourse analysis to compare and contrast different ideological perspectives, including secularism, traditional religious beliefs, and non-traditional religious movements. By analyzing the discourse, the researchers gain a comprehensive understanding of the ideological landscape and the factors influencing religious self-identification and conversions.

The authors used a two-stage quota sampling method to ensure representation from different demographic groups. The sample includes adults aged 18-65 years residing in urban and rural areas across 14 regions and 3 cities of republican significance in Kazakhstan. The sample size ranges from 1,500 to 3,000 respondents.

According to the nature of religious commitment in our research, respondents are divided into cohorts:

a) believers who are in the community, following religious norms, religious lifestyle, or so-called "true believers";
b) believers who do not participate in the religious life of the community, but adhere to the ritual from time to time, or nominally believers;
c) believers who do not belong to confessions, who have formed their own idea of God, or non-confessional believers;
d) non-believers who can adhere to rituals and traditions and respect believers, or so-called "sympathizers";
e) indifferent to religious self-identification, indifferent to religion, f) atheists.

The study also incorporates the opinions of 50 experts from various backgrounds, including civil servants, academics, journalists, and representatives of religious associations. These experts provide valuable insights and assessments on the ideological mindset of the population and the societal impact of religious beliefs and values. Their opinions are considered in the analysis and interpretation of the findings.

Personal formalized interviews are conducted with the selected respondents. The interviews are conducted face-to-face in either Kazakh or Russian, based on the respondent's preference. The interviews employ a structured questionnaire to gather information on religious beliefs, values, religious practices, and socio-demographic characteristics. Focus group studies are conducted to gather in-depth qualitative insights. Participants representing different target groups are selected, considering factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, professional background, and settlement affiliation.

The collected data is processed and analyzed using the SPSS program. Cross-tabulations and statistical analyses are performed to identify patterns, trends, and relationships between variables. The analysis focuses on comparing different demographic groups, age cohorts, and ethnicities to understand the variations in religious self-identification and values.
3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Cultural and civilizational contexts of the formation of Kazakhstan’s mentality

The majority of respondents perceive Kazakhstan as a multi-confessional country (89.3%), with a predominance of believers representing two main or traditional religions (72.8%) - Sunni Islam and Orthodoxy. Due to the demographic characteristics of the population, 64.1% tend to attribute Kazakhstan to the countries of the Islamic world. The growth in the number of supporters of the paradigms "Kazakhstan is a multi-confessional state" and "Kazakhstan is a country of two main religions: Islam and Orthodoxy" is fixed with increasing age, while the paradigm "Kazakhstan can be attributed to the countries of the Islamic world" is shared by more representatives of young and middle generations. Ideologems regarding the need for secularism of the state, the commitment of Kazakhstanis to the two main culturally-forming confessions, ideological self-identification in accordance with the ethno-cultural tradition, etc. are not shared by an increasing number of respondents. The number of supporters of the paradigm "Kazakhstan, due to the demographic situation, can be attributed to the countries of the Islamic world" is growing and there has been a steady increase in supporters of turning Kazakhstan into a religious state.

The number of supporters of the transformation of a secular type of state into a religious one is studied in a representative country sample and shows a significant growth trend from 4.1% in 2000 to 22.2% in 2020. Dependence is shown: the younger the respondents, the more opponents of the secularism of the state are among them.

The absolute majority of respondents in all age groups want to live in a secular state with a predominance of Islamic tradition (in the ranges from 74.5% to 82.1%). Among respondents aged 25 to 54, one in four 18-44 years old and one in five 45-54 years old respondents believe that Kazakhstan should become a religious state with regulation of public and private life by religious norms.

On the issue of scaling up the religious lifestyle, the opinions of experts are polarized: some believe that the level of religiosity is stabilized and commensurate with the level of countries with average religiosity, others believe that the religionization of society is increasing and may lead to a real threat of the loss of a secular type of state with the activation of directed and interested external influence in the Central Asian region (Baidarov, 2013). At the same time, the conditions for the growth of religiolization according to non-traditional vectors for the Kazakh mentality are substantiated, which are associated with the prospects of a rapid increase in the pace of Islamization (compared with other vectors: evangelization and neo-orientalism) and reformattting the type of statehood.

3.2 Contours of religious self-identification

The analysis of respondents’ religious self-identification in mass surveys of 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 indicates the formed trends (in descending order of scale): significant predominance of nominal religiosity; stabilization of confessional-oriented religiosity; pulsating values of non-confessional religiosity. With a high nominal level of religiosity of society (up to 82% of respondents can identify themselves as believers), only a small part of Kazakhstanis (7% on average in the array) considers religious affiliation to be the most important identification status in the structure of multidimensional self-identity (Table 1).
Table 1: Trends in Religious Self-Identification and the Significance of Personal Statuses: Analysis of Mass Surveys in Kazakhstan (2013-2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Year of the survey</th>
<th>The trend of changes in self-identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstanian</td>
<td>2013: 60.7; 2018: 73.1; 2021: 73.5</td>
<td>Significantly increased and stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member</td>
<td>2013: 53.3; 2018: 83.5; 2021: 80.2</td>
<td>Significantly increases and stabilizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of an ethnic group</td>
<td>2013: 53.1; 2018: 41.7; 2021: 38.7</td>
<td>Shows a slight downward trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>2013: 16.0; 2018: 26.3; 2021: 27.4</td>
<td>It has increased significantly and shows a tendency to stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident of the city/village</td>
<td>2013: 13.0; 2018: 24.8; 2021: 22.6</td>
<td>Significantly increased and &quot;pulsating&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of the profession</td>
<td>2013: 13.6; 2018: 9.6; 2021: 8.2</td>
<td>Shows a downward trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A religious person, a representative of the community</td>
<td>2013: 13.0; 2018: 6.4; 2021: 7.0</td>
<td>Significantly decreased and shows a tendency to stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the collective (labor/educational)</td>
<td>2013: 10.9; 2018: 10.3; 2021: 5.5</td>
<td>Demonstrates a tendency to a significant weakening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A citizen of the world</td>
<td>2013: 10.2; 2018: 12.6; 2021: 17.7</td>
<td>Demonstrates a tendency to progressive growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour</td>
<td>2013: 2.2; 2018: 10.0; 2021: 10.0</td>
<td>Significantly increased and stable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Subjective significance of personal statuses (population as a whole, in% of the number of respondents, N= 1500 (2013), N=1800 (2018), N=1500 (2021))

3.3 Subjects and factors of ideological influence

The analysis of the factors influencing the formation of beliefs and worldview orientations of the respondents revealed following findings (Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Factors Influencing Formation of Beliefs and Worldview Orientations](image)

The findings highlight the multi-faceted nature of factors that contribute to the formation of beliefs and worldview orientations. The immediate environment, education, self-determination, life circumstances, information sources, religious interactions, and societal influences all have varying degrees of impact on individuals’ perspectives (Shalbayeva et al., 2021).

The teaching of religious studies in the secular education system is practiced in Kazakhstan. Experts' assessment of the effectiveness of teaching relevant subjects at school and university for the formation of value consciousness among young people is ambiguous.

Every third expert believes that the religious studies knowledge acquired during training determines the value choice of the worldview among young people. At the same time, every fifth expert believes that religious studies in the education system is not significant for the formation of a...
proper ideological culture and self-identification. Every fourth expert is sure that the teaching of religious studies is not provided with qualified personnel, and the subject "Religion and the foundations of secularism" in secondary school is not accepted by a sufficiently large number of parents (6.7%).

Some experts have suggested that religious studies do not have a systematic and even overview character, teaching religious studies does not arouse interest among the overwhelming number of students and therefore is not able to have a significant impact on the worldview.

Every second indicated that the teaching of religious studies in schools, colleges, universities should be continued, every fourth spoke in favor of limiting the teaching of religious studies in secular educational institutions and about 40% of experts indicated that religious studies should be studied only in religious educational institutions and in the appropriate education system.

At the same time, more than half of the experts believe that it is necessary to expand the influence of religion in culture, in politics, to allocate quotas for religious figures in Parliament, and every fifth expert is sure that it is not necessary to emphasize the importance and promote the increasing role of religion in Kazakh society in any of the spheres of life (Tungatova et al., 2023).

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan's society is characterized by a mixed – secular-religious context of life. Almost every second respondent (46.7%) noted that in everyday life he acts partly with religious, but mainly with secular norms, as more common norms in our society. 19.5% prefer to be guided in their behavior only by secular norms, because they are more in line with their worldview and lifestyle. 18.9% of respondents appeal to the unconditional normativity of religious prescriptions as a source of moral behavior for each person. 13.1% of respondents refer to the exclusivity of following secular norms because they include both values and anti-values, without which it is impossible to imagine modern life, that is, they recognize the presence of anti-values in their behavior.

3.4 Religious tolerance and conversions

The complication of the ideological palette is accompanied by the expansion of the sphere of religious tolerance and the development of an increasingly tolerant attitude towards possible ideological conversion among representatives of the immediate environment (family, friends). 71.1% of respondents perceive the change of religion as a private matter and a human right, 18.1% consider it as a betrayal of the faith of their ancestors, 13.8% interpret it as a manifestation of spiritual weakness, 9.2% assess it as the result of active missionary activity of non-traditional religious associations aimed at influencing religious choice, 8.2% qualify it as an omission of traditional religions for Kazakhstan (Hanafi Madhhab Islam and Orthodox Christianity); 6.2%) – regarded as a flaw in the secular system of education and upbringing; 6% - consider it as a means to change their social status, 5.9% - designate it as an attempt to change their financial situation.

The paradigm of the need to adhere to traditional religions for the ethnic groups of Kazakhstan or accentuated by the state-supported traditional religions for believers (meaning Hanafi Madhhab Islam and Orthodox Christianity) is approved by 72.8%, disapproved by 27.2% of respondents. Ethnically, respondents-Russians (31.9%), respondents of other ethnic groups (30.5%), respondents-Kazakhs (25.1%) disagree with this statement.

The statement that Kazakhstanis have the right to a new religious experience is shared by 27.5% of Kazakh respondents, 17.7% of respondents - Russians and 10.9% of respondents - representatives of other ethnic groups. According to the assessment of the attitude to the fact that relatives will decide or have already decided to change religious beliefs, the connotations are presented in the Figure 2.
Figure 2: Attitudes towards New Religious Experiences and Changes in Religious Beliefs

Experts have noted trends in religious conversions: more and more fellow citizens from among non-practicing believers are becoming practicing believers (25.8%). This opinion is expressed mainly by analysts, journalists, bloggers, public and political figures (30.3%), as well as teachers and secular scientists (29.3%). Theologian experts believe that more and more atheist citizens are becoming believers and/or coming to non-traditional religions (26.7% each).

The vectors of religious changes observed by respondents indicate their greater intensity in society than among acquaintances or in the family.

Experts believe that transitions from one religion to another do not change the spiritual and moral health of Kazakhstanis for the better: there is a loss of religious tradition, ethno-cultural identity (30%), they do not significantly affect the spiritual and moral health of the nation, are a marker of secularism, correspond to the process of democratization, act as a criterion of globalization (30%); the spiritual and moral health of Kazakhstanis improves in the process of religious searches; an increasing number of fellow citizens turn to religious faith (16.7%).

23.3% of experts believe that the consequences of the process of religious conversion of Kazakhstanis have not yet become apparent, their effectiveness needs to be studied because it has no analogues and has its own specifics in Kazakh society.

The contour model of religiolization based on the conducted sociological measurements captures such features as visual and statistical reformatting of the religious landscape by a) scaling the process of conversion to traditional and non-traditional Islam of young people and women, b) active evangelization of different age and ethnic cohorts of the population, c) growth of non-confessional believers mainly of middle age, d) popularity of new century religions (cults, neo-orientalist practices, etc.) among the young and middle generations, e) consolidation of quasi-religions in the format of healing cults, trading and financial pyramids, etc.; changing the structure of the worldview mentality depending on the type and nature of adherence to faith, daily religious practices, lifestyle according to the religious calendar, and other markers; the expansion of the number of atheistic fellow citizens mainly among the middle and older generations and slightly among the youth.

In Kazakhstan, the secular-religious life context prevails with a tilt towards secularism. It manifests itself both in the preferences of the respondents themselves and in their environment (in the family, among colleagues, among friends). In the ethnic projection, exclusively secular norms and
values are held mainly by Russians (62% vs. 35% among other ethnic groups and 33% among Kazakhs); both secular and religious norms are representatives of other ethnic groups (45%) and Kazakhs (44%), mainly religious norms are other ethnic groups and Kazakhs (respectively 12% and 9%).

Mixed religiosity of Kazakhstani families is recorded. The results are presented in the Tables 2-3.

Table 2: Family Environment and Religious Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' View (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Believers in the family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both believers and non-believers in the family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-believers in the family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty with religious identification of family members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Family Lifestyle and Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' View (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle associated with religious rules and traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle far from religious requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion not related to national (ethnic) affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renounced any faith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5 Priority values

In the conditions of ideological pluralism, the implementation of the principle of secularism of the state and in the context of multicultural tradition and multi-confessional structure in Kazakh society, young people find themselves in a situation of unlimited religious choice. Experts, assessing the extent to which Kazakhstani youth are exposed to religious influence and familiarization with the relevant norms and values, lifestyle (depending on specific religious denominations, movements, groups), indicated a similar intensity and scale in relation to Islam of the Hanafi Madhhab (33.3%), according to the parameter of a greater degree of influence on youth, RO "Jehovah’s Witnesses" (30%), Buddhists (33.2%), non-traditional Islamic movements (26.7%). The influence of Hare Krishnas (20%) is comparable, according to experts, with the influence of Orthodoxy (20%).

In the context of the globalization process, cultural borders are open for compatriots and there are no restrictions on movement, choice of faith, and building a personal life. The focus group discourse captures a critical and ambiguous attitude to the analysis of Western values for Kazakh culture. Respondents almost always agree that other values are common in Western societies that are not acceptable to us. At the same time, it is noted in several narratives that Kazakhstani children and youth strive to get an education, start a family and work abroad, because they do not see special personal prospects, high quality of life, necessary support from the state here (Sadvakassova et al., 2022).

The study participants see positive values and traditions of Western societies in the implementation of the principle of the changeability of power, in multiparty system; in the availability of high-quality higher education; in a sufficient standard of living for families with able-bodied members; in a more competitive pension system and a decent old age; in a variety of leisure, accessibility of tourism for people with average incomes; in the technologization of life, including Gen. Advantages of Western values: freedom, the possibility of choice, the creation of material benefits for public utility and for people; a developed strong economy; conscious attitude to career; existing respect for the individual, regardless of whether you are a simple person or a minister; ensuring public order.

The respondents of the focus groups were required to name only one positive and one negative
sign of the influence of religious values. Positive signs: spirituality, peace, decency, faith, well-being, kindness, forgiveness, prohibitions, relationships, community; bring peace of mind, reduce aggression, increase manageability of people, regulate life by religious norms; a person becomes kinder to others, abortions are prohibited, you can take four wives; religious people have some other that is the sphere of life and diversity: holidays, services, fasts, etc., discipline, cleanliness, order are observed.

Negative signs: narrow-mindedness, foggy mind, difficulties of creeds, it is difficult to navigate the diversity of faiths, zombification, prohibition of secular education and knowledge, unequal status of women; if a person completely goes into religion, then he seems to be leaving society: he has a lot of restrictions (TV is not allowed, there must be a certain hairstyle, religious clothing); religious life takes a lot of time and can cause some inconvenience in work (if a person keeps a fast, he needs to read prayer, there are not always conditions for this); fanaticism, religious dictatorship, prohibition of one’s own opinion, radicalism.

The accents in the priorities of certain values (Kazakh secular values, Western liberal values, Islamic religious values, Eastern religious and orientalist values, a conglomerate of different values) were studied among experts who were asked to assess which cohorts of the population: age, ethnic, ideological, property, etc. specific values affect (at the same time, a scale of values was proposed, according to which values 1 – practically do not affect, 2 – affect slightly, 3 – significantly affect).

The expert assessment revealed that under the predominant influence of Kazakhstan’s secular values are middle-aged (34-45 years) and older (46 and older) citizens; more often – Kazakhs, somewhat less often - mestizos, Russians and others; indifferent to religious faith and atheists; fellow citizens with different income levels.

Western liberal values are close to young people from 14 to 33 years old, more often inherent in Russians and mestizos, less often - Kazakhs and other ethnic groups, as well as those indifferent to religious faith and atheists; fellow citizens with high and medium incomes.

Islamic religious values are most rooted among young people aged 19-33; among Kazakhs, Muslim believers; more often inherent in fellow citizens with low incomes, less often – fellow citizens with medium and high incomes.

Eastern religious and orientalist values are more common among young people and middle-aged people; more often among Kazakhs and less often among other ethnic groups and mestizos; more often among those indifferent to faith and atheists, as well as among non-confessional believers; approximately equally among fellow citizens with equal incomes.

The hierarchy of the most important Islamic values in public perception showed that more than half of respondents believe that the most important for Muslim believers should be: prayer - 58.2%, fasting - 53.9%, following the symbol of faith (witnessing) - 51.9%, pilgrimage - 48.7%. The analysis of the assessment of the significance of canonical Islamic values for Muslim believers has shown

- the paradoxical nature of their understanding by respondents as optional for Muslim believers (see the data "Significance for Muslim believers" in Table 4),
- the distribution of their universal value in the social context for all fellow citizens, regardless of belonging to religion and faith (see "Significance for all citizens" in Table 4),
- the coincidence of Islamic values with the universal content of traditional morality and high standards of moral culture of everyday life.

Table 4: Assessment of the significance of Islamic values for Muslim believers and for all citizens regardless of religion (population, array, %, N=3000, 2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamic Values</th>
<th>Significance for Muslim believers</th>
<th>Significance for all citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To make a prayer</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observe the fast</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow the creed (witness)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamic Values</th>
<th>Significance for Muslim believers</th>
<th>Significance for all citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To carry out a pilgrimage</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live a full life and always be ready to return it back - at the first request of God (Allah)</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give charity tax and alms in favor of the poor</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not force faith</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To share the ban on artificial termination of pregnancy, vows of celibacy, monasticism and seclusion</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To consider the appearance of a child in the family as a gift from God and to carry out the continuation of offspring in marriage</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To follow marital fidelity, not to allow adultery, adultery</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choose a middle path between wealth and poverty</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To comply with the ban on murder and suicide, on euthanasia</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To restore friendship with the one who interrupted it</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not strive for self-interest</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be fair</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not keep feelings of suspicion and distrust of one's neighbor in your hearts</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To honor the property created as a result of labor</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be merciful, to encourage each other to compassion</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be guided by the arguments of reason (not to make decisions in anger, in a situation of irritability)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverently treats any idea, even different from his own worldview</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To condemn immorality, cruelty, aggression and bloodshed</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not claim someone else's property</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be hospitable</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unite in the name of good deeds, not enmity</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not use alcohol, drugs, etc.</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively participate in the life of your country</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be law-abiding, loyal to the authorities who respect religious values</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Conclusion

The dynamics of ideological self-identification (including religious) at the level of society, groups and individuals is relevant due to the high degree of incorporation of religious contexts into everyday practices, on the one hand, and the uncertainty of the role and significance of institutional factors, on the other. Under the influence of the processes of deideologization of public life (reduction of ideological orientation in education, transformation of value paradigms), since the early 90s. the mental fractures of the last century coincide with an accentuated revival of spirituality (it began to be identified mainly with religious). During the years of sovereignization, the transition to ideological pluralism has taken place, and in these realities, it is important to understand how the institution of religion, religious affiliation, values have established themselves as significant.

The religious situation in Kazakhstan is not found to be analogous in comparison with other regions of the world: with the reduction of the multi-ethnic area, a multi-confessional landscape is reproduced, which act as the foundations and prerequisites for the reproduction of the ideologeme of uniqueness as unity in diversity.

The results of the study of the process of religiosity in Kazakhstan has revealed the following trends:

- the ideological atmosphere of society has changed, including along such demarcation lines as "secularism/religiosity", "traditional religiosity/new religiosity", "true religiosity/quasi-religiosity";
- the role of traditional religion has increased, in the context of which a religious subculture is formed that influences the observance of customs and traditions;
the fusion of religious and folk culture has become widespread and "every day and ceremonial" religiosity has intensified;
- a "new religiosity" has been formed, which has supporters in all social cohorts;
- quasi-religiosity is being scaled, the "hidden" religiosity associated with radicalization and extremism is not fully manifested;
- the formation of value preferences, beliefs, and worldviews is becoming accessible to various subjects of influence: religious media, the Internet, social networks, new religious associations with their media resources are taking an increasing place as institutions of ideological socialization;
- the goals of ideological and religious influence, the channels of ideologeme transmission, the ways of reformatting consciousness through new communication technologies have changed, cyberreligion is becoming more and more evident;
- religious organizations have replaced a number of socialization functions that were previously performed by secular institutions (for example, such as liberation from alcohol and drug addiction, involvement in employment, structuring a meaningful life perspective, choosing a companion and arranging family life, etc.);
- the consequences of extremism for religiously motivated reasons have manifested themselves and there is a need for programs for the re-socialization and reintegration of not only radicals, but also women and children who arrived from combat operations;
- the immersion of an increasing number of Kazakhstanis (including women, youth) in marginal quasi-religious practices and lifestyle forms isolated communities with a specific mentality, contributes to the segmentation of society on top of civic values, outside of social regulation of relations;
- religiosity appears not spontaneously functioning, but procedural;
- the risks associated with the loss of intellectual potential, traditional ethno-confessional identity, quasi-religious archaization, and a decrease in national competitiveness are increasing;
- religion and religiosity acquire politically accentuated statuses, in connection with which new challenges appear and the scope of risks associated with the tasks of forming a worldview identity correlated with the goals of society development is determined;
- the risks associated with the spiritual security of society and the state have manifested themselves: unrealized requests for the instrumental capabilities of secular ideology create conditions for the promotion of religious ideology;
- expert discourse captures the delay of political decisions in influencing the religious sphere of life.
- The unrealized demands of society regarding the instrumental capabilities of the secular state create conditions for the promotion of religious ideology, which determines the dynamic growth of adherents of religious statehood.

To address the challenges of ideological pluralism and ensure social cohesion in Kazakhstan's multicultural society, policymakers and stakeholders should focus on promoting interfaith dialogue and understanding, fostering inclusive educational programs that emphasize common values, supporting initiatives that encourage shared cultural experiences, and investing in media platforms that promote tolerance and respect for diverse beliefs. Reformatting the stratagem regarding religion in a secular state, determining the status of religious institutions in the structure of a multi-confessional society is relevant for Kazakhstan. It is necessary to find a balance between secular and religious, to develop effective state approaches in cooperation with religious institutions as subjects of diverse activity, to emphasize the interests of the state in the proper ideological socialization of youth.
5. Acknowledgement

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References


