



## Research Article

© 2021 Muhammad Kamran and Asma Khan Mahsood.  
This is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons  
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License  
(<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>)

Received: 28 October 2020 / Accepted: 5 December 2020 / Published: 17 January 2021

# Dynamics of Indian Antagonist Approach towards CPEC and Its Implications for Pakistan

Muhammad Kamran

Asma Khan Mahsood

M. Phil Scholars,  
Department of Political Science,  
Gomal University,  
D.I.KHAN, KP, Pakistan

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36941/mjss-2021-0003>

### Abstract

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is considered as a game-changer for Pakistan and for the whole region. The whole region of Pakistan can take benefits of the projects of CPEC carried out under the umbrella of One Belt One Road initiative. This paper is aimed to explore the regional dynamics of CPEC and Indian antagonistic role towards this project. Pakistan is one of the prime states in China one belt one road initiatives. China is executing a multiyear investment in multibillion dollars program and termed it China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Several projects are included in this plan for instance Industry, communication infrastructure and energy which cost almost USD 46 billion. It is expected that CPEC will contribute remarkably in reducing poverty and socio-economic development of Pakistan. Thus, keeping in view, the benefits of CPEC, most of the analyst claimed it to be the most important mega project in Pakistan. They also claim that it will greatly benefit the people of both countries i.e. Pakistan and china.

**Keywords:** BRI, CPEC, India, Pakistan, Antagonism, International Trade

## 1. Introduction

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is often called as a 'Fate Changer' as well as a 'Game Changer', is a mega project of billion dollars' worth. This project will deeply influence Pakistan's as well as regional economy along with international connectivity. This project will also have deep impacts on regional and international politics as well. Therefore, it is often termed as an equation changer from every aspect i.e. from national, regional and international levels.

Pakistan is one of the prime states in China one Belt one Road initiatives. Together with Pakistan, China is executing a multiyear investment in multibillion dollars program and termed it China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Several projects are included in this plan for example Industry, communication infrastructure and energy which cost almost USD 46 billion. It is expected that CPEC will contribute remarkably in reducing poverty and socio-economic development of Pakistan. Thus, keeping in view, the benefits of CPEC most of the analyst claimed it to be the most important mega project in Pakistan. They also claim that it will greatly benefit the people of both countries i.e.

Pakistan and China.

This corridor is very important for Pakistan because it will further strengthen its relationship with China. The cordial relationship between the two countries is always of mutual convergence and cooperation. The geostrategic position of Pakistan plays a vital role in regional politics in course of history, and this has added something worthy for the project but in recent times the security situation specifically the unrest from Indian borders and the Afghan Taliban hostilities poses a great threat for this project.

A common view about CPEC is that it is an economic project. This view is however is not complete in all its terms because CPEC has many political, cultural, strategic and civilization dimensions. It will also have its impacts not only for south Asia but for other regions also like, East Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, Africa and Gulf countries. Although, the core objective of the project will remain geo-economic development but after its implementation it will have many more beneficial outcomes which can be observed with the passage of time. Therefore, it is necessary to study this program from different fronts. As its multidimensional nature will greatly benefited the state of Pakistan, therefore the Indian antagonistic approach towards this project seems to be increasing day by day. This paper will primarily dig out various facts about the benefits, prospects and challenges to CPEC from different stakeholders. Conclusions and implications will then be drawn regarding the near to the medium term.

## **2. Pakistan and Its Neighbors**

Pakistan plays a vital role in international foreign relations due to its geo-strategic, religious, and historical position. Pakistan has two autonomous territories, four provinces and one federal territory. Pakistan exists in South Asia and shares her 6,774 kilometers long border with four countries, out of them two have nuclear capability i.e. China and India. Pakistan shares its northern border which China, India (43%) lays in its Eastern side and to its west and north-west, and Iran (13%) and Afghanistan (36%) are located respectively. This strategic position guarantees that Pakistan has a prominent role in international relations. Pakistan relations with its neighbor are dynamic has witnessed ups and downs (Awan, 2018). Since its inception in 1947, its relations with India are full of rivalry and suspicion. They have fought several wars. Its relations with Afghanistan have been historically not so good. Afghanistan claim over parts KPK and FATA (Durand line 2, 250 kilometers long) and Pakistan role during USSR and US invasions have worsened their relations. Historically, Pakistan and Iran had close ties due their religion/ cultural and geostrategic bond. In the early stages relations with Iran were not only friendly but were strong and cordial, but after Islamic revolution in Iran relation between Pakistan and Iran witnessed signs of strains, but still both the state has cordial relations (Pattanaik, 2019). Pakistan has 808 kilometers long border with Iran. Relations with China are exceptionally strong, over the last several years, their relations have strengthened their bilateral strategic and economical relationship. The coastline of Pakistan extends 1,050 km (650 mi), 250 km falling in Sind province and 800 km in Baluchistan. It borders the productive NE Arabian Sea famous for its upwelling phenomenon. It also serves as a significant sea trade route between Pakistan and other states. Pakistan identified Gwadar as a port site in 1964. However, it was only in 2001 that significant steps were taken with the help of Chinese assistance in the construction and development of the deep-sea port. Before Gwadar, Karachi was the major port city for conducting international trade (Michael, 2018).

## **3. Historical background of Indo-Pak relations**

The split between India and Pakistan have a deep historical root. But the main conflict between the two originated when the British announced that the two are divided into new sovereign states. This plan was announced on June 3, 1947. Plan means that Hindu majority areas will be given to India and the Muslim majority areas were to be a part Pakistan of (Cheema, 2015). All those leaders who

represented Muslims as well as Hindus interest accepted this plan (Sattar, 2007). Both Pakistan and India appeared as independent state as a result of this plan in 1947. Pakistan was created in the Muslim majority areas in North West and North East of the sub-continent, hence appeared as East Pakistan and West Pakistan (Guneratne and Weiss, 2014).

### 3.1 *Major conflicts between India and Pakistan*

The conflict between Pakistan and India has been known as one of the most un-resolved and enduring conflict of the time. Throughout the history of Pakistan and India witnessed multiple conflicts upon multiple issues. Both have limited bilateral relations and failed to resolve their issues amicably. Different think tanks and scholars have identified many reasons for this continuous rivalry between the two states. A bitter memory was created by this bloody partition in which millions of people lost their lives and possessions while crossing the borders. Pakistan recorded many reservations against India that it did not hand over her due shares and assets which were decided in the plan of 3<sup>rd</sup> June. But the most major factor that leads to the first war of 1948 between the two newly independent states was Kashmir issue (Ishtiaq, 2013).

The Kashmir issue was created when Pakistan demanded it to be with Pakistan because most of the Kashmiri population are Muslim. But the Hindu ruler of Kashmir decided to join India. As a result of this Issue Pakistan and India fought a war for few months which was ended as a result of one-third of Kashmir region to be part of Pakistan and the remaining under the control of India (Paul, 2006).

Relations between Pakistan and India since their emergence have been described by hatred and suspicion. There are several issues which both the states have of mutual disagreement. Historically both countries have fought four wars since partition. The bone of contention between them is Kashmir.

First war between Indo-Pakistan was fought in 1948 over the status of Kashmir. In 1949, UN intervened, and both the parties agreed to have plebiscite under the UN-supervision to decide the future of Kashmir. The plan was not implemented as the armies of both sides did not leave Kashmir and the plebiscite never take place (Noor, 1998).

The war in 1965 was break out between the two states after several cross-border insurgencies in the southern Pakistan areas of Rann of Kutch along the border of Kashmir, with Indian initiate to implement presidential order on Kashmir. 6<sup>th</sup> September 1965 India attacked two big cities of Pakistan Sialkot and Lahore. UN backed USSR intervened ceasefire came into effect. A year later both the parties signed a Tashkent Declaration in which both states agreed to bring back their armies to their position as it was in August 1964 (Sridharan, 2005).

In 1971, East Pakistan witnessed a civil war. Pakistan claimed that the civil war was backed by India. This led to another Indo-Pak war. Division of Pakistan was the result of this war. Simla agreement was signed between Bhutto and Gandhi. As per the agreement the all the disputes in future will be settled through peace and bilateral talks. It was also a part of the pact that Territory and captured soldiers were to be returned (CAS, 2016).

In 1974 India tested its nuclear capability and Pakistan considers it as threat towards it, thus Pakistan started its own nuclear program. Tension reached to its climax in April 1984 when troops were installed in area of Siachen that was not determined in UN-1949 agreement of cease-fire. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zia-Ul-Haq reached to an agreement that to not hit nuclear installation of both the states. Sophisticated talks began in 1986 between the Indo-Pak governments to settle down the Siachen glacier issue and to have trade between them (Noor, 1998).

India carried out its nuclear test in May 1998, which followed by a series of tests by both countries and faced economic embargos by United States and other countries. Although the tension was on its peak but bilateral affairs started improved when in Feb, 1999 Vajpayee the then prime Minister of India travelled Lahore for conference with his Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The unpleasant accident of Kargil, when insurgents took positions near the Indian-occupied Kashmir.

This turned into almost a full fledged war (FES, 2015). Ultimately the due to international community cry United States brokered the ceasefire and Militants from India occupied Kashmir was pulled out. In Dec 2001, Indian parliament was attacked by militants, which further widen the gap between Indo-Pak, but both the countries showed maturity and resumed two sided meetings in 2004 (Ishtiaq, 2013). Kashmir was hit by a massive earthquake in 2005, and both the countries agreed for the solution of philanthropic crisis. Samjhauta Express accident in 2007, followed by attack on Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and Mumbai attacks in Nov 2008 brought bilateral talk to the point of standstill. In 2010 both countries Foreign Minister met in 2010, and hope that such higher level, composite dialogue will take place in near future (CAS, 2016).

### 3.2 *India and Pakistan relations from realistic perspective*

Through the lens of realism one can easily understand Indo-Pak historical relations and conflict. Their relationship is full of several wars, numerous border skirmishes, and endless hostility. International relations can be best explained through hypothetical perspective of realism and have the ability to analyze and describe the veracities of global politics, like unfriendly relations and concord in the framework of Indo-Pak tussle.

International anarchy, force, power, national interest, militarization and rationality are the main elements of international system under realism. As it was defined by Donnelly that realism theory is “a tradition of analysis that stresses the imperatives states faces to pursue a power politics of the national interest” (Ali, 2013).

From the foregoing it is argued that the best explanation of Indian and Pakistani conflict behavior and their dyadic focus on each other is from a combination of the Subaltern Realist perspective and the Regional Security Complex approach, building on the approaches of Ayoob, and Buzan and Waever.

Realistic perspective of international system, elaborate Indo-Pak conflict in all-inclusive way since their birth are regarded as radical (anarchic) system with fear of force from opposite side. Such fear of force equally shares by both countries “to selfishly seek and expand power in an endless competition to ensure survival or maximize absolute power” (Mearsheimer, 2001). International system according to realism is believed to be great significance to force, power, anarchic and militarization and weaponries by a state (Glaser, 2016).

All the above statements and definitions explain Indo-Pak relations and conflict which goes through a series of ups and down. Since their inceptions they went to hostility and leads into three full fledge wars and two restricted wars.

### 3.3 *Indian antagonism*

India has strong reservations regarding the CPEC but prior to the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Beijing in September 2014, it formally registered a strong protest the construction of the CPEC. According to Indian media, Chinese Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned by the External Affairs Ministry and informed that since the project was also being routed through Kashmir over which India staked claims, it had serious reservations (NDTV report May 12, 2015). President Xi had dismissed objections, describing the economic corridor as a “commercial project” (Express Tribune May 12, 2015).

From the very first day of CPEC inauguration, Indian adopted the politics of antagonism towards it. This pursuit has come out with their policy of isolating Pakistan in the region and malevolence. These antagonistic policies by Indian side have triggered another cause for hostility with the neighboring country. Yet china shows its optimism that along with other states of the region, India will also get benefited from this project of huge investment (Jabeen, 2015). In antagonist response, India has largely opposed CPEC project and raised serious allegations that route is planned to pass through Gilgit Baltistan the so-called disputed territory for India. India has vehemently asked

China to give value to other's strategic interests and called for specific actions to "prevent growth of negative perception". Moreover, in reaction India is investing Chahbahar port, with an estimate of US \$500 Million in phase-1 of development of counterweight to Gwadar (Mirza, 2016).

### 3.4 Dynamics of Indian antagonism

CPEC as major security threat to India:

There are many reasons why India sees CPEC as a major security threat:

1. China's funding and construction/upgrading of these ports aims at gaining access to naval facilities, perhaps even permission to set up bases here in the future. The strategy would give China permanent access to the Indian Ocean, through which vital shipping routes for China's oil imports from the Persian Gulf run (Reuters,18, 2015).
2. Gwadar port is said to be the western-most "pearl" in this "string." Its strategic location near the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz is of concern to India as 63 percent of India's oil imports are transported via this waterway. A very important fact to note (Dawn, May 28, 2015).
3. Also, there is a major threat to India's own defense system. In the event of a military confrontation with India or if China decides to come to Islamabad's aid in an India-Pakistan war, CPEC's infrastructure will facilitate Chinese deployment of troops rapidly to India's western front, as well.
4. Pakistan and China enjoy a warm relationship that goes back over five decades. Economic and defense co-operation is robust, including in the nuclear field. Co-operation over CPEC is expected to further cement the Sino-Pakistan bond, triggering concern in India (Japan Times ,19, 2015).

### 3.5 Historical Bases of Antagonism

The Indian antagonistic attitude towards CPEC has a strong historical ground. For example, India is not only a major regional player but also a strong global economy as well. It has geographical proximity with both Pakistan and China. She had also fought many wars with both the states. With Pakistan, Indian relations since the very inception need no explanation. Both the states have fought almost three wars and except these wars both are ideologically, politically, and militarily against each other. Now with CPEC, India is frightened that this will give Pakistan an opportunity to become a major economic power in the region hence she will become capable to deter Indians policies easily (Dawn, 2018).

Likewise, if we look at Indian-China relations, the situation is not very different. The dispute between the two is no longer limited to the war of 1962, although both the countries have strong economic relations. According to an estimate almost \$70 billion trade occur between the two annually. But Chinese close relations with Pakistan and not supporting Indian stance to eliminate terrorism from Pakistani soil create problems in building smooth political relations between the two. In this regard China refuses to support India's appeal to ban Masood Azhar, chief of Jaish E Mohammad at the United Nations. Secondly China is continuously creating Hurdles in Indian way for her membership in Nuclear Supplier Group. Many countries support India for joining this group, but China is creating hurdles for her by saying that China will support Indian entrance to this group if other countries support Pakistan's entrance to the group which further add fuel to the fire (Brooking Institute, 2015).

## 4. Geography

### 4.1 Kashmir as a disputed territory

Since 2015 India repeatedly propagating that some of the projects of CPEC are planned to be

implemented in some parts of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Foreign minister Swaraj, while addressing a press conference clarified Indian position by saying that “the Prime Minister during his visit took up the issue very firmly and spoke every strongly that the CPEC going through PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) is unacceptable.” Sawaraj further said that Chinese personals in India have been summoned by the prime minister to record their protest and clarified Indian position (Aneja, 2016).

To address Indian protest on this issue both China and Pakistan, are repeatedly rebutting Indian objections. Deputy Director General of Asian Affairs, Huang Xilian stated while dismissing Indian claims that “We know the concern of the Indian side and those projects are not political projects. They are all for livelihood of people. There is no commercial action by China in that part of the region” (Panda, 2016).

#### 4.2 *Gilgit-Baltistan as threat to strategic interest of India*

Another Indian objection is the passage of the route passing through the so-called disputed territory of Gilgit Baltistan as well. They had repeatedly asked China and Pakistan as well to respect their strategic interests. They asked China for specific actions to “prevent growth of negative perception”. India said that Gilgit Baltistan is a disputed territory. Even India had criticized Pakistan in 2015 for her decision to hold election in Gilgit Baltistan. Vikas Swarup spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs explained, “The entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, which includes regions of Gilgit Baltistan, is an integral part of India. The election is an attempt by Pakistan to camouflage its forcible and illegal occupation of Gilgit Baltistan.” Although China had advised Pakistan to make a constitutional amendment and change the status of Gilgit Baltistan, but Pakistan refused to do so because she thinks that this step could weaken Pakistani stand on Kashmir issue (The Indian Express, 2015).

#### 4.3 *Gawadar’s geostrategic position as threat to India*

Thirdly India also feared the Chinese massive engagements in different parts of South Asia. For example, India feared that Gawadar will less likely to serve as a center of economic activities but this can serve as a Naval base for China in future. Indian concerns are that by this way China will expand its footing in blue water and will have capability do military engagements through Indian Ocean easily in future. This strategic presence of China in the Arabian Sea has created greater concerns for India, because India said that although CPEC will be an opportunity for many to generate economic benefits and jobs in short term but in longer term, if China use it for strategic purpose it will tilt the balance of power in Chinese favor (Wagner, 2016). In the words of Sameer Patil, ‘India’s concerns about the CPEC and China-Pakistan ties are combined with Beijing’s growing presence and influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. In the last decade, China has systematically engaged with countries in India’s neighborhood such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives through economic and military aid. Although India’s poorly executed neighborhood policy may be partially responsible, India sees China’s growing profile in the region as an “encirclement”. For this purpose, India have also invested heavily (almost \$500 Million) in phase-1 of Chahbahar port which is considered as to counter strategy to Gawadar port (Mirza, 2016).

### 5. **Economic**

Another major reason behind Indian antagonism is Pakistan’s economic growth as a result of CPEC. She is uncomfortable with CPEC because it is said by many think tanks that Pakistan would become a center of trade for the whole region. With the establishment of duty-free economic zones many other states will show their interest to join CPEC. A school of thought in Indian foreign policy department thinks that CPEC will revitalize Pakistan’s economy which is a potential threat to India (Waller, 2015). For India, the Economic and strategic benefits of CPEC to Pakistan, means Pakistan’s strength and

military power because Pak-Army has a huge share in Pakistan's annual budget. She is also unhappy with the development of Gawadr port and repeatedly pressurizes Chinese government to retreat the CPEC project. It is said by many that India will do anything to deter the benefits of CPEC and for this purpose she has also started the development of chahbahar port to compete with Pakistan (Bhutta, 2015). There is also a view that although Indian spokespersons oppose the CPEC project because of strategic purpose but it is also a well-established fact that India is fearing the economic outputs of the project as CPEC has the potential to boost Pakistan's economy to a new heights (Patil, 2015).

Given all the above mentioned reasons, India is spending resources and money and tries to sabotage the CPEC. For this purpose, she also offered aid and money to Baloch rebels etc to sabotage the project via espionage activities. According to Pakistan security agencies, Research and Analysis Wing has established a special desk with special duties to stop the development of the project by different means and for this purpose special budget have been allocated to this department (News, 2015).

### 5.1 *Meaning of the term economic corridor*

To understand the project of CPEC, we must have information about the meaning of the term Economic corridor. The term economic corridor is used for networks of infrastructure inside a described geographical zone planned to enhance economic growth. These corridors may be designed within a state, between different states or among different regions. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor is not a new thing. Corridors already exist in Africa, Europe and Asia. The term was first used by Asian Development Bank(ADB) in 1998. It was defined by ADB in the following way, "economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets" (Baber, 2018). The economic corridors are planned to achieve broader objectives like transportation, logistic services, community involvement, institutional instruments that will resulted in economic development (Hussain, 2016).

### 5.2 *What is CPEC?*

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative envisioned by president Xi Jinping in 2013 for the economic integration of Eurasia through belts and roads and other infrastructure initiatives (Ali, 2016).


The Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, His Excellency Mr. Sun Weidong, has summarized CPEC in the following manner, "CPEC is a long-term and systematic project to promote economic cooperation through collaboration on Gwadar port, energy, trans- portation infrastructure and industrial cooperation. "CPEC will bring solid benefits to our two peoples. With the completion of energy and infrastructure projects, conditions in Pakistan will improve" (The News, 2015).

The policy of President Xi initiating a "Constructive Engagement" gives a new direction to Chinese foreign policy. The major aim behind this policy was to have great economic engagements with multiple state. For the achievement of this purpose the idea of OBOR was presented which was a network of Railway, roads and maritime routes. This route is also name as One Belt One Road. This route will help China in the promotion of trade and other financial initiatives. Many experts believe that these initiatives will not only focus over Chinese trade and economic cooperation but it will also create Chinese economic hegemony at world level (Wang, 2015, Daniel S. Markey and James West, May 12, 2016, ). Asian Infrastructure in different countries, naval bases, Development banks, are stated by some experts as the example of Chin's motives of economic supremacy (Xu, 2015, Amna Ejaz Rafi,, July 11, 2016).

**Table 1:** Major projects of CPEC

S.No	Project Name
1	Construction of highways and railway tracks
2	Development of Gwadar port
3	Energy generation projects
4	Establishment of industrial zones along the C-PEC route (Fig.1)
5	Laying down of pipelines for oil and gas transmission
6	Cyber networking and telecommunication
7	Water supply projects for industrial and municipal use (mostly in Baluchistan)

Source: (Farooqui, 2018)



**Figure 1:** Overview of major projects under CPEC

Source: Farooqui, 2018

The route and map of CPEC holds extreme significance. This route can be divided into Eastern and Western route. The eastern route will be passing through Makran, Karachi, Sukker, Hyderabad, Multan, Lahore, Mansehra, Raikot to Khunjarab. The western route is through the areas of Gawadar, Turbat, Surhab, Bismah, Quetta, Qalat, Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar. This route will provide the Chinese government the shortest ever route for its trade (Furqan, 2018).

CPEC is a project that links the strategically important city of Gawadar in Pakistan's Balochistan province with the city of Kashgar in China's Xinjiang province. This route will be used for the passage of good and services between the two states. China will also get access to Middle East through this route (Ahmad, 2015).

Many constrains are also in way of CPEC project like economic and political development, security related threats and geo-strategic dynamics (Sial, 2014). However, Pakistan has greater opportunities to take benefits from this project as China is the second largest economy of the world. The \$46 billion investment in Pakistan can play an important role to uplift the weak economy of Pakistan (Kataria & Naveed, 2014).

## 6. Conclusion

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is labeled as fate and game changer. Beijing and Islamabad both understand there are multiple advantages of China Pakistan Economic Corridor. It will provide shortest route from Shanghai to Europe for its transportation and on the other hand it will shorten transportation of oil from the Gulf countries to main Chinese market. The significance of CPEC mainly includes three points: first, it can revive Pakistan's stagnant economy and boost its power to balance India's regional hegemony; second, it can create more jobs and improve social welfare in the country; third, it can offer a fulcrum for China towards the Indian Ocean and hedge India's overwhelming superiority in sea power. It will also enable China to be one of the major players in imports-exports in global trade. It will strengthen Sino-Pak economic ties and will reach bilateral relations to new heights. It will help in restoring regional peace and can improve standard of life of the people of South Asia. CPEC will help Pakistan in different sector and capacity. It will help Pakistan to overcome of its energy shortfall. It will also help in minimizing political differences and create a vast circle of job and employment. It is assumed that project will bring economic stability and prosperity on hand and on the other side it improves law and order situation and eliminating extremism. Through this project Pakistan would try its best to resolve the grievances of underdeveloped parts especially Balochistan.

Beside its maximum benefits for both partner states, there are various hurdles and challenges to China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Poor economic and balance of payment issue, along with Balochistan insurgency and terrorism are some of the issue but one of the main issues is Indian antagonism to CPEC. Historically Indo-Pak relations are full of mistrust and hatred. Both have ideological, geographical and political differences on various issues. These two states have fought three full fledge wars and one limited war since their emergence. It is very impressive that on the matter of CPEC both military and civilians are on the same page. They always united to tackle any issue by joint collaboration and to ensure to exploit the benefits of this great project. For this purpose, they have striven to ensure security related issues and started certain operations of which Operation Zarb e Azab is one of the examples. National Action Plan were also signed in a joint All parties conference and it was committed that it will be implemented. A number of targeted operations in Karachi and Balochistan were launched with positive results.

In conclusion, China Pakistan Economic Corridor has possibility to strengthen Sino-Pak economic relations to new heights and can reshape regional politics. It is assumed that the project will provide an exclusive boost to China's OBOR initiative. Due to mega billionaire infrastructure projects, geopolitical and economic interests of many key actors, few of them see this game changer project of CPEC as threatening light. India and United States has shown hostility towards it, combined with the current law and order and security situation in many areas along the corridor, is a challenge in the successful implementation of project and to get maximum benefit of it.

So, for as Indian sponsored terrorism is concerned, it is the need of the time that Pakistan must expose it at international fronts. Pakistan has already done a great job by exposing Indian antagonism by presenting dossiers to United Nation and United States. However, as it is a sensitive issue therefore Pakistan needs to start a diplomatic opposition of Indian antagonism at global level to deter Indian agencies.

## References

- Abbas, K. (2016). Two-day national conference on "CPEC: Macro and micro economic dividends for Pakistan and the region" held on 20-21 September 2016, in Islamabad, Pakistan. *Islamabad Policy Research Institute*.
- Abid, M., & Ashfaq, A. (2015). CPEC: Challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. *Journal of Pakistan Vision*, 16(2), 142-169.
- Abuzar, M. A., & Hassan, M. U. (2017). Do CPEC power plants impact Pakistanis environmental condition: Evidence from literature. *Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies*, 3(2), 255.
- Ahmad, I., & Ebert, H. (2013). Will Pakistan's India policy under Sharif shift strategically? *Strategic Analysis*, 37(6), 667-674.
- Ahmad, R., & Mi, H. (2017). China-Pakistan economic corridor and its social implication on Pakistan: How will CPEC boost Pakistan's infrastructures and overcome the challenges?. *Arts and Social Sciences Journal*, 08(02).
- Akhtar, M. (2015). "China-Pak economic corridor: Benefits for Afghanistan. *Daily Outlook, Afghanistan*, August 15, 2015, [http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post\\_id=12836](http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=12836).
- Ali, A. (2016). China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Prospects and challenges for regional integration. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies*, 7(1), 1-15.
- Ali, S. (2013). Prism of constructivism. Regional Affairs. *South Asian Voices*. June 11, 2015. <https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-india-relations-through-the-prism-of-constructivism/and-the-need-for-an-assessment-of-india's-role>, SADF Comment, Volume 19, South Asia
- Awan, M. A. (2018). Pakistan-Iran Geo-Political Environment and the Discourse of Relations (1947-2017): A Reappraisal. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, 39(1).
- Barber, C. E. (2014, Feb. 27). The Pakistan China Corridor: A new project will give Pakistan the tools of globalization. Will it use them? *The Diplomat*. <https://the-diplomat.com/2014/02/the-pakistan-china-corridor/>.
- Behraves, M. (2015). Pakistan, The Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 494 pages. ISBN 978-0-19-906636-0. \$45.00. Ishtiaq Ahmed. 2013. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 7(3), 489-491.
- Biswal, N. D. (2015). The New Silk Road Post-2014: Challenges and Opportunities. *Presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, January, 22*.
- Burles, M. (1999). *Chinese policy toward Russia and the Central Asian republics* (No. RAND/MR-1045-AF). Rand Corp Santa Monica CA. p. 52 (<http://www.rand.org>).
- Chance, A. (2016). The belt and road initiative and the US-China relationship. *China US Focus*, November 3, 2016.
- Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2017). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches*. (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.) Sage Publications. ISBN: 9781412-995313, 448 pages.
- Daily Times. (2016). Deny Soil to RAW, Pakistan Tells Iran. *March 27, 2016*. <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/27-Mar-2016/deny-soil-to-raw-pakistan-tells-iran>.
- Daily Times. (2016). Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of Iran-Media Brief during Pakistan's Visit. *March 26, 2016*. <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/26-Mar-2016/gwadarchabahar-ports-to-link-pakistan-iran-with-central-asia>.
- Daniel, S., Markey, A., & Raghavan, T. C. A. (2016). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor discussion, Carnegie India. *New Delhi, July 2, 2016*.
- Dawn News. (2016). China Welcomes Enhanced Cooperation with Iran on CPEC. *October 18, 2016*. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1290724>.
- Express Tribune. (2016). Chinese Pressure Sees Pakistan Mull Constitutional Status of Gilgit Baltistan. *January 7, 2016*. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1023523/chinese-pressure-sees-pakistan-mull-constitutional-status-of-gilgit-baltistan/>.
- Fahim, S., & Zeeshan, Y. (2018). Financial Institutions and Chinese Investment: The Review of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Policy. *European Journal of Economics and Business Studies*, 4(2), 73-82.
- Farooqui, M. A., & Aftab, S. M. (2018, September). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; Prospects and Challenges for Balochistan, Pakistan. In *IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering* (Vol. 414, No. 1, p. 012046). IOP Publishing.
- Fazil, D. M. (2018). CPEC Today: Regional integration or estrangement? *Regional affairs. South Asian Voices*. February 27, 2018. <https://southasianvoices.org/cpec-today-regional-integration-regional-estrangement/>.
- Hamad, H. A. (2018). Powering Gwadar. *Daily times*. On August 8, 2018. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/279733/powering-gwadar/>.
- Hamzah, S. G. S. (2016). CPEC: The Game Changer. *Nation*, July 12, 2016.

- Hussain, E. (2016). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Will it sustain itself?. *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 10(2), 145-159.
- Hussain, E. (2019). CPEC: Governance and security challenges—Implications for the Belt and Road Initiative. *Chinese Political Science Review*, 4(1), 135-147.
- Hussain, M. (2017). *China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Challenges and the way forward*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States.
- Jabeen, M. (2015). Proposed Silk Road and Pakistan-China Economic Corridor: Threats and Opportunities, 183-184. In *Proceedings of International Conference on CPEC (2015)*. Lahore: GC University.
- Jauhari, A. (2012). India-Pakistan relations: International implications. *Asian Social Science*, 9(1). doi:10.5539/ass.v9n1p42.
- Joshi, M., Abidi, S., & Rai, A. (2017). The Eco-Politics of CPEC and India. Available at SSRN 2982942.
- Kaplan, B., & Duchon, D. (1988). Combining qualitative and quantitative methods in information systems research: a case study. *MIS Quarterly*, 12(4), 571-586.
- Khan, R. Q. A. (2018). CPEC Investment Court—An Investment Protection and Dispute Resolution Mechanism for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Available at SSRN 3148731.
- Kleveman, L. (2003). *The new great game: blood and oil in Central Asia*. Grove Press. ISBN1843541211, 9781843541219.
- Kumar, S. (2007). The China-Pakistan Strategic Relationship: Trade, Investment, Energy and Infrastructure. *Strategic Analysis*, 31(5), 757-790.
- Kurečić, P. (2010). The new great game: rivalry of geostrategies and geoeconomies in Central Asia. *Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik*, 72(1), 21-46.
- Mahar, A. (2015). Why China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative matters for Asia. *Azernews*.
- Malik, A. R. (2015). A miracle on the Indus River. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved, 11. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/a-miracle-on-the-indus-river/>
- Mustafa, S., & Zafar, A. (2017). China Pakistan economic corridor: importance and challenges for Pakistan and China. *International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research*, 2(11), 5059-5068.
- Nakhoda, A. (2017). CPEC offers vast opportunities to tap into the Chinese economy. *Tribune - The Express*. [online]. Available from: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1303768/cpec-offers-vast-opportunities-tap-chinese-economy/>.
- Panda, A. (2016). US assistance to Pakistan set to fall to lowest level since 2007. *Diplomat*, August 27, 2016.
- Pattanaik, S. S. (2019). India-Pakistan relations: What lies ahead?. *Revista UNISCI/ UNISCI Journal*, (49), 159-172.
- Price, I. (2016). Is the US Trying to Sabotage the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. *The Diplomat*, 29.
- Rajasimman, S. (2015). India in US Strategic Rebalance in Asia-Pacific. *Indian Defence Review Blog*, January 30, 2015.
- Richard, E., & Hoagland, B. (2015). Developments in South and Central Asia. *Speech, Washington International Business Council, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2015, US State Department*, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2015/243087>.
- Rizvi, H. A. (2015). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Cooperation and Socio-Economic Development. *Strategic Studies*, 34(4), 1-17.
- Rupert, J. (2016). Is the United States Ready for the Next India-Pakistan Crisis?. *United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., March 21, 2016*.
- Sadiq, S. (2015). People-to-People, Political and Parliamentary Exchanges to induce impetus to existing warm Pak-China Relationship. *Press Release, NAP, Thursday, 12<sup>th</sup> February, 2015*.
- Samad, Y. (2018). CPEC and security: Pakistan's foreign policy. *Asia Dialogue*. August 20, 2018. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/08/20/cpec-and-security-pakistans-foreign-policy/>.
- Saunders, P. C. (2014). China's rising power and the US rebalance to Asia: Implications for US-China relations. In *China's Power and Asian Security* (pp. 85-107). Routledge.
- Schneider, M. (2016). Book Review: Arjun Guneratne and Anita M. Weiss (eds), *Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia*. *Studies in Indian Politics*, 4(1), 134-135.
- Shah, S. (2015). China to build pipeline from Iran to Pakistan. *The Wall Street Journal*, 9.
- Sophia, S. (2016). US not happy over Pak-China growing relations, CPEC. *Pakistan Observer*, June 14, 2016.
- Sridharan, E. (2005). International relations theory and the India-Pakistan conflict. *India Review*, 4(2), 103-124.
- Talwar, S. (2015). China Pakistan economic corridor and its geo-political implications. *CAPS in focus Center for Air Power Studies New Delhi*. 22 June, 2015, [www.capsindia.org](http://www.capsindia.org)
- The Indian Express. (2016). PM Modi raises India's Concern over CPEC which runs through PoK. *September 4, 2016*, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/prime-minister-narendra-modi-raises-indias-concern-over-cpec-which-runs-through-pok-3013260/> (accessed December 19, 2016).

- The Indian Express. (2017). Pakistan planning to lay 135 km-long optic fibre cable to evade Indian surveillance? *Updated: October 1, 2017 3:51:08 pm*. <https://indian-express.com/article/pakistan/cpec-communications-network-overhaul-may-be-driven-by-fear-of-india-4869631/>.
- The News. (2015). Special Cell Set up in RAW to Foil Economic Corridor. *News, May 11, 2015*, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/12423-special-cell-set-up-in-raw-to-foil-economic-corridor>.
- Tribune. (2016). Game changer: All provinces will reap benefits of CPEC, says PM. *The Express Tribune, Pakistan*. *Published: January 12, 2016*, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1026007/game-changer-all-provinces-will-reap-benefits-of-cpec-says-pm/>.
- Wagner, C. (2016). The Effects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on India-Pakistan Relations. *German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2016*.
- Wallar, J. (2015). Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor: Opportunity for US, Indian & ASEAN Statesmanship. *Cogit Asia CSIS Asia Policy Blog, September 2, 2015*.
- Weitz, R. (2006). Averting a new great game in central Asia. *The Washington Quarterly, 29(3)*, 155-167.
- Winchester, S. (2016). US Backs India-Iran Chabahar Port Deal as it Outflanks China-Pakistan Gwadar Project. *Pakistan Defence Blog, May 26, 2016*.
- Wolf, S. (2016, June). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An assessment of its feasibility and impact on regional cooperation. In *SADF Comment, South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), Brussels, Belgium*.
- Zaidi, S. A. (2016). The new game changer in Pakistan. *The Hindu, 28*.